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So much of barbarism... still remains in the transactions  
of most civilised nations, that almost all independent countries  
choose to assert their nationality by having, to their own inconvenience  
and that of their neighbours, a peculiar currency of their own. 
-- J.S. Mill (1848) 
Abstract 
The emerging system at the European level can be conceptualized as a pattern of relations among 
member states that tends to be reproduced despite disturbances in individual trajectories.  The Markov 
property is used as an indicator of systemness in the distribution.  The individual trajectories of 
nations participating in the European Monetary System is assessed using an information theoretical 
model that is consistent with the Markov property in the multivariate case.  Economic and monetary 
integration are analyzed using independent data sets.  Increasing integration can be retrieved in both 
of these dimensions, notably since the currency crises of 1992 and 1993.  However, the dynamics for 
countries which have strongly coupled their currency to the German Mark are different from those 
which did not.  Additionally, developments in inflation and exchange rates at the European level are 
assessed in relation to global developments. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since its ratification in December 1991, European politics has been under the spell of the Maastricht 
Treaty on European Union and, in particular, of its Protocol on the Convergence Criteria.i  Since a 
sufficient number of countries were able to satisfy the criteria in 1997, the transition to the final stage 
of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 can be made: the introduction of a single European 
currency, the Euro.  In addition to replacing its predecessor the Ecu, which is already in use as an 
accounting unit for transactions between European central banks, the Euro is meant to replace existing 
European currencies, by 2002 at the latest, not merely as a unit of account but as a means of payment 
and store of value.  This replacement will necessitate a monetary policy elaborated at the level of the 
European Central Bank. 
 The introduction of a single European currency implies a transition to a system of fixed 
exchange rates among the participating nation states. By thus forming an economic and monetary 
union, European countries are expected to enjoy the benefits of lower transaction costs and greater 
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market integration within their union.  Externally, a stronger position can be achieved with respect to 
non-EMU economies such as the USA.  However, the member states will lose their freedom to 
conduct an independent monetary policy and, in particular, they will lose the exchange rate instrument 
as a means to adjust for shocks and diverging developments in the real economy. 
 This potential cost of monetary integration has led economists as well as politicians to agree 
on the need for articulating some sense of prior "convergence" among candidate EMU member 
countries.  At the political level, the governments of the EU countries have agreed, by signing the 
Maastricht Treaty, to make participation in the EMU dependent on the fulfillment of so-called 
"convergence criteria" for prices, interest rates, fiscal deficits, and exchange rates.  Economists, 
however, have criticized these criteria for being either too narrow or too broad, and even for being 
mutually inconsistent.ii  As De Grauwe (1996) has noted, for instance, the criteria do not take into 
account the need for "real convergence," which has been considered a necessary requirement for an 
"optimum currency area" (Mundell, 1961; cf. Eichengreen, 1991).iii 
 How can one measure whether a system is converging to integration?  The answer to this 
question obviously depends on one's definition of the term "convergence."  One approach is to follow 
Collignon's (1994: 43) suggestion and assess the degree of European monetary integration in terms of 
the Maastricht convergence criteria themselves, since these are in fact the entry tickets to EMU 
insisted upon by governments, and are therefore important indicators for financial markets.  We shall 
discuss this below as the political approach. 
 Another approach, which is more in line with economic theorizing, and which we will 
therefore term the economic approach, involves defining convergence in terms of so-called 
"purchasing power parity" (PPP).  PPP is achieved within a system of currencies when all real 
exchange rates are equal to one.  Whether currencies are converging to PPP can be assessed by testing 
whether the real exchange rates are increasingly "covariance stationary" around one.  Empirically, this 
turns out not to be the case for European countries (e.g., Cheung et al., 1995; Dutt and Gosh, 1995).  
However, this result may be biased at least in part because of the problems involved in measuring 
absolute price levels and comparing them between countries.   
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 A more popular way to test for PPP is, therefore, to analyze whether a so-called 
"cointegrating vector" exists, that is, to test for any linear combination of prices and nominal 
exchange rates which is stationary (Baillie and Selover, 1987; Banerjee et al., 1993).  However, as has 
often been overlooked, the existence of a cointegrating vector can be interpreted as evidence of 
"nominal convergence" only if this vector transforms price indices into absolute price levels.  Since 
these vectors are typically not unique, they cannot usually warrant the inference. 
 Given these differences in the economic and political definitions of the problem, it seems 
more fruitful to begin by testing independently the two questions of whether a European economic 
and/or monetary system is emerging.  In terms of data, we will follow the "political approach" by 
using nominal exchange rates between national currencies for testing emerging systemness at the 
European level in the sense of the Maastricht Treaty.  Real Effective Exchange Rates as constructed 
by the IMF will be used for testing economic integration among the nation states involved in terms of 
"purchasing power parity."  Our results will then enable us to specify which countries are coevolving 
into a single union and in which respects.   
 Our methodology is based on Theil's (1966 and 1972) elaboration of Shannon's (1948) 
measure for probabilistic entropy.  From this perspective, a system is considered as a pattern in the 
distribution that is maintained despite disturbances (Theil, 1972; Leydesdorff, 1991 and 1995).  This 
methodology enables us to test for systemness in the data in terms of the so-called Markov property, 
as against non-systemness as the alternative hypothesis of trajectories at the national levels; and it also 
allows us to indicate sub-groups of nations that are increasingly forming a system.  Before addressing 
the technicalities of our methods, however, let us first examine the "convergence" criteria of the 
Maastricht Treaty in more detail, using descriptive statistics. 
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 2. Convergence According to "Maastricht" 
 
A number of conditions for the EMU were specified in the Protocol attached to the Maastricht Treaty. 
 As noted, these conditions are almost exclusively of a monetary kind.  For example, a country will 
have met the "convergence criterion" for exchange rates, if it "has respected the normal fluctuation 
margins provided for by the ERM of the EMS without severe tensions for at least the last two years 
before the examination" (Protocol on the Convergence Criteria, at p. 185). 
 The "ERM of the EMS" is the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary 
System (EMS). It was established in 1979 with the purpose of stabilizing exchange rates between the 
currencies of member states of the European Union (EU).iv  This was done by keeping the nominal 
market exchange rate of each ERM currency vis-à-vis any other ERM currency within preassigned 
margins around bilateral central parities. These bilateral fluctuation margins, which served as 
mandatory intervention limits, were set, for most countries, at 2.25 percent on each side of the central 
parity, so that the width of their fluctuation bands was a total of 4.5 percent. 
 Since the currency crisis of August 1993, however, the margins for all ERM currencies, 
except for the German Mark and the Dutch Guilder, have been widened to 15 percent of the central 
rate, so that the fluctuation band width is now 30 percent. This increase has obviously made it easier 
for countries to respect the bounds, as well as to satisfy the Treaty's additional requirement that "the 
member state shall not have devalued its currency's bilateral central rate against any other member 
state's currency on its own initiative for the same period."   
 Although realignments of central rates did occasionally happen in the past, no changes in 
parity grids have taken place since March 1995, when the Spanish Peseta was devalued by 7 percent 
and the Portuguese Escudo by 3.5 percent.  Thus, according to the Treaty's convergence criterion, 
nominal exchange rates have sufficiently "converged" by now in order to allow for their definite 
fixation by introducing the Euro.  As noted, however, this is mainly a political convergence criterion, 
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which is not particularly supported by economic theories of exchange rate determination.  According 
to the latter, movements in nominal exchange rates should reflect those in relative price levels. 
 The Maastricht Treaty indeed specifies as an additional convergence criterion the requirement 
that EMU countries have "[a] price performance that is sustainable and an average rate of inflation, 
observed over a period of one year before the examination, that does not exceed by more than 1.5 
percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing member states in terms of price stability. 
Inflation shall be measured by means of the consumer price index on a comparable basis, taking into 
account differences in national definitions."  The Treaty does not specify how exactly differences in 
national definitions should be taken into account. Yet the "raw" annual data on consumer price indices 
(CPIs) provided by the IMF do suggest "convergence" in the inflation rates of the twelve EU 
countries that signed the Maastricht Treaty (see Figure 1).  Based on these data, the convergence 
criterion for price stability was met by ten countries in 1996.   
Figure 1. Inflation Rates 1980-1996
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 This measurement of "convergence" in terms of the growing number of countries whose 
inflation rates exceed the mean of the three lowest inflation rates in any period by not more than 1.5 
percent, is completely ad hoc.  One does not need to run a statistical test in order to see, simply by 
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looking at Figure 1, that the relative distance between inflation rates has decreased over time.  Apart 
from Greece, all these EU countries now have inflation levels below 5 percent.  However, this low 
level of inflation need not have been anticipated by the Maastricht Treaty.  According to its political 
definition, "convergence" could have occurred just as well at much higher levels of inflation.  
Furthermore, convergence in the rate of change of prices does not imply convergence in price levels.  
In fact, if price levels were different to begin with, convergence in inflation rates would have 
reinforced these differences.  
 We propose to move to alternative measures of convergence, which are informed by systems 
theory, and which enable us to estimate convergence in price levels and nominal exchange rates 
independently.  The implications for monetary and economic integration will be discussed in the 
concluding section.  We will be able to show that the two types of integration are both taking place, 
although they have hitherto not been coupled. 
  
 
3. Methods 
 
Is a European system emerging on top of a set of firmly integrated national systems?  In order to 
answer this question, let us define a second-order system as a specific distribution or "network" of 
exchange relations which tends to be reproduced over time.  The national systems can then be 
considered as the "nodes" of the European network, and the question to be answered is whether 
structure is maintained at the network level inspite of disturbances at the nodes.  The emerging 
network is a system insofar as it is reproduced as a pattern that is relatively independent of the 
historical trajectories of the composing (sub-)systems.  Note that the emerging system is thus not 
considered an aggregate, but as an interactive effect of the relations among national systems. 
 In other words, the nation states follow their own historical trajectories as economic and 
monetary systems, while the European system unfolds on top of them as an emerging "exchange rate 
regime."  Since a system is expected to stabilize the variation at its nodes, the current state of a system 
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then provides the best expectation of its next state.  When the current state is, in fact, the sole 
determinant of the next state, the system can be said to satisfy the Markov property.v   
 The "states" of a system need not be one-dimensional.  The system as a whole is, typically, a 
multivariate arrangement that is reproduced at each moment in time, while the underlying nodes 
develop over time as univariate trend lines.  Information theory allows us to separate these "micro" 
and "macro" developments analytically, and then to test for systemness at the level of the distribution. 
 This is done by comparing the predictions based on the assumption of systemness with those 
obtained on the basis of the individual time series autoregression.  The difference between these two 
expectations can be quantified in terms of Shannon's (1948) information measure. 
 
 
3.1 Information Theory 
 
The information measure developed by Shannon (1948) is based on the assumption that the amount of 
information conveyed by the occurrence of an event i, or by the message stating that this event has 
occurred, is inversely proportionate to the probability pi of that event occurring.  Intuitively, when i is 
expected to take place with high probability, the fact that it did indeed take place contains very little 
information.  Conversely, when the occurence of i is improbable, the message stating this occurrence 
must be considered highly informative. 
 Using the negative of the logarithm as a particularly convenient function which is continuous, 
monotonically decreasing in pi and non-negative on the domain [0,1], Shannon (1948) defined the 
amount of information as: 
 
  h(pi) = - 2log(pi) 
 
where 2 was chosen as the base of the logarithm so as to let information be measured in binary digits 
(bits).vi  Using this definition, the expected amount of information over the entire distribution of 
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events turned out to be equivalent to what is also called "probabilistic entropy" because of the formal 
similarity with the entropy function in thermodynamics: 
 
  Hi = - Σi pi 2log pi 
 
The dynamic equivalent of this measure was provided by Theil (1972), as the expected information I 
of the message that the prior distribution (Σ pi) has been transformed into the posterior distribution 
(Σ qi):vii 
 
  Ii = Σi qi 2log qi/pi 
 
The extension of both formulas to the multivariate case is straightforward: 
 
  Hijk... = - Σijk... pijk... 2log pijk... 
  Iijk... = Σijk... qijk... 2log qijk.../pijk... 
  
 
3.2 Application of Shannon's measure to applied forecasting 
 
The Shannon/Theil methodology enables us to model change in univariate and multivariate 
distributions within a single and integrated framework.  Although Theil (1966, Chapter 11) suggested 
an extension of the dynamic algorithm to the case of time series analysis, he himself never related this 
to the Markov chain perspective for systems (cf. Theil, 1972, Chapter 5).  In Appendix 1, we therefore 
derive an algorithm that is consistent with the Markov property for the multivariate case, but which 
allows us, in addition, to make best predictions for the next year based on autoregression in the 
univariate trend lines of sub-systems.  Thus, we will be able to compare the assumption of separate 
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trajectories for each country with the assumption of systemness in the exchange relations in terms of 
the quality of the prediction.   
 The basic idea is that one is able to compare the distribution of a given time-series (1, 2, ...., 
n) with a hypothesized distribution, by comparing the prediction for (n + 1) with its actual value.  
Given that no other information is available, the expectation is that I = 0.  It can be shown (see the 
Appendix) that the expected value Fn+1 can then be written as: 
 
  Fn+1 = Fn {(Σ1n Fi - F1} / {(Σ1n Fi - Fn} 
 
 Note that this formula can be applied to any series of discrete values which represents an 
individual history.  It can additionally be shown that in the case of a multivariate set, this formula is 
consistent with the noted Markov property.   
 For example, on the basis of Table 1 (which constitutes one of the datasets to be explained in 
more detail below) one is able to make a prediction of the (n+1)th observation, based either on the 
rows representing the histories of each national currency or the columns representing the distribution 
of the system of currencies in each year.  Since the rows and columns are orthogonal, these two 
predictions are completely independent, yet they can both be expressed in bits of information and can 
therefore be compared (after proper normalization). 
 Given the two prior predictions (Σ pi and Σ pi') on the one hand, and the actually occurring 
posterior distribution Σ qi on the other, the improvement of the revised prediction Σ pi' over the 
original prediction based on Σ pi is defined as follows: 
 
  Ii  =  Σi qi log (qi/pi) - Σi qi log (qi/pi') 
   (= original prediction - revised prediction) 
   = Σi qi log (pi'/pi) 
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In other words: whether the revision of the prediction implies an improvement of the prediction 
depends on the relative uncertainties associated with the two predictions.   If the revised prediction is 
associated with a smaller uncertainty than the original one, I is positive and the prediction is 
improved; negative values of I indicate a worsening of the prediction.   
 Since we are not testing a single hypothesis against the data, but two hypotheses against each 
other using limited data, "significance" does not have its common statistical meaning (cf. McCloskey, 
1985).  For the reader's information, we will place results between brackets when the differences 
between the two predictions are less than an order of magnitude, that is, if I on the basis of the 
multivariate predictions is less than or larger than ten times the summation of univariate predictions 
(after proper normalization).  Since the expected information of the improvement is additive, hence 
decomposable, this methodology enables us to evaluate for which (group of) countries the assumption 
of systemness provides a better prediction than than the alternative assumption of independent 
development (cf. Theil, 1972). 
 The qualitiy of the univariate predictions is, of course, sensitive to the length of the time 
series on which they are based. We exhaust our data by comparing all possible, yet consecutive time 
series with a minimum of three years including the year m under study (that is m, m-1, and m-2).  The 
comparison with the multivariate prediction is based on the lowest I for each individual country.  As 
the time series are longer for more recent years, the univariate predictions are increasingly precise.  
Consequently, the test for systemness at the network level in recent years is more powerful.  This is 
relevant with respect to our research question of whether a European system has recently emerged. 
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 4. Data 
 
While nominal exchange rates denote how many units of a foreign currency can be obtained in 
exchange for one unit of a domestic currency, real exchange rates can be considered as a measure of 
how many foreign goods can be obtained in exchange for one unit a domestic goods. 
  
 
4.1 Nominal Exchange Rates 
 
We used the nominal exchange rates data provided by the OECD Economic Outlook of December 
1996 (Annex Table 37).  This "OECD data set" is exhibited in Table 1.  The table contains data for 31 
national currencies vis-à-vis the US dollar, based on averages of daily rates for the period 1984 to 
1995.viii  Additionally, estimates and projections are given for 1996, 1997, and 1998.  Since the data 
were estimated on 4 November 1996, we only used the values for 1996.ix   
 For the years 1984-1991, data are missing for the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.  
Given that our research question did not involve these three countries in particular, we decided to 
leave them out of consideration, hence reducing the number of currencies to 28.  In order to make the 
analysis based on nominal exchange rates comparable with that based on real effective exchange rates 
(REER), we had to change the unit of account from the US Dollar to the German Mark and the base 
year to 1990.  These normalizations are strictly technical. 
 
 
4.2 Real Effective Exchange Rates 
 
Given that no data on absolute price levels are available, the data which best approximate real 
exchange rates, in our view, are the Real Effective Exchange Rate (REER) Indices provided by the 
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IMF.  The REER indices are constructed by using trade weights, which take into account the relative 
importance of a country's trading partners in its direct bilateral relations with them in both home and 
foreign markets, the competitive relations with third countries in particular markets, and the 
differences among countries in the importance of foreign trade to the manufacturing sector.  In other 
words, the indices adjust for movements in costs and prices affecting exports and imports of 
manufactured goods.x 
 In order to make our REER based analysis comparable to the analysis based on nominal 
exchange rates, we constructed annual REER indices by averaging over each year's monthly values 
(see Table 2).  We limited the comparison to the twelve EC countries that signed the Maastricht 
Treaty only, for reasons which will become clear below.  Since the IMF (1997) does not provide 
REER indices for Greece, this country had to be left out of consideration.  (See, however, the remarks 
in notes 4 and 9 about the special status of Greece given this country's monetary policies.) 
 
 
5 The global system of currencies 
 
5.1 Descriptive statistics using exploratory factor analysis 
 
Using the annual nominal exchange rates of Table 1, factor analysis teaches us that during this period 
two monetary systems can be distinguished.  A two-factor solution (accounting for 87.5% of the 
variance, using Varimax) is revealed in Table 3.  On the one hand, one observes a group of currencies 
(Factor Two) that correlates with the US Dollar, and on the other, a group that correlates either 
positively or negatively with the German Mark and the Japanese Yen (Factor One).   By sorting 
factor loadings within Factor One, the prevailing structure of the European bloc during this period is 
clearly made visible.  Relatively floating currencies are distinguished from the ones which have 
deliberately been anchored to the German Mark.  In this representation both the French Franc and the 
Japanese Yen are represented within this latter group.  The UK Sterling, on the other hand, exhibits a 
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pattern similar to the Italian Lire, and, for example, the Mexican Peso.  These currencies exhibit a 
negative correlation to the DM bloc, but only some of them join the UK Sterling in also correlating 
with Factor Two representing the US Dollar bloc.  
 The best representative of the US Dollar bloc during this period (1984-1996) has been the 
Hong Kong Dollar.xi  Note Singapore's secondary orientation towards the Japanese Yen.  
Furthermore, the French Franc is the only member of the group correlated with the German Mark and 
with nevertheless a positive loading on the factor representing the US Dollar bloc.  In summary, the 
dynamics within the European system seem to prevail as a pattern at the level of the global system of 
currencies.  One legitimate question, then, is under what conditions would a unified Europe be able to 
profit from stabilizing its exchange rate regime? 
  
 
5.2 The Markov test in the case of the global system 
 
Let us first consider the null hypothesis that the 28 currencies of the OECD data set constitute a single 
system, in the sense of exhibiting the Markov property.  Using the methods described in section three, 
we will test this hypothesis by comparing, for each year, the univariate forecasts with the multivariate 
forecast. 
 Table 4 gives an overview of the improvement of the predictions based on the assumption of 
systemness (i.e., multivariate forecasts) over the predictions based on the alternative hypothesis (i.e., 
the normalized sum of univariate forecasts) for the various years.  If the improvement is positive, the 
hypothesis of systemness is corroborated, while a negative value can be considered as a rejection of 
this hypothesis.  The first column displays the result on the basis of using the raw data.  As it turns 
out, the systemness assumption is always rejected.  However, this result is potentially flawed, since 
the distribution of exchange rates is, in general, not invariant with respect to changes over time in the 
units in which currencies are denominated.xii 
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 The second column of Table 4 is based on normalization by setting 1990 = 100 for each 
country and using the German Mark.  The results given in this column imply that the assumption of a 
"global system" can then be rejected in almost all years.xiii 
 
 
6. Is a European System Emerging? 
 
6.1 European Union (EU) versus European Community (EC) 
 
Let us now limit our analysis to the 15 member states of the current European Union (EU).  Since 
Belgium and Luxembourg use a single currency, this implies a set of 14 currencies.  As a second 
frame of reference, we will use the 12 member countries of the former European Community (EC) 
which originally signed the Maastricht Treaty.  As explained above, Greece is removed from this 
comparison for various reasons.  Hence, our second frame of reference will be a set of 11 EC 
countries. 
 Table 5 provides the results for these two European systems of reference, EU and EC, in a 
format similar to Table 4. On the basis of nominal exchange rates, the group of 11 EC members 
appears to have functioned as a single system, with the exception of some disruptions in the early 
1990s.  As noted before, this is likely to indicate the currency crises of 1992 and 1993.  For the EU 
group, however, the assumption of systemness almost never leads to an improvement of the 
prediction, although it seems to do slightly better after 1993. 
 The third column of Table 5 provides a similar test for the real exchange rates for the 11 EC 
member states.  (Belgium and Luxembourg can now be taken separately, since they differ in terms of 
prices levels and trade patterns.)  The hypothesis of systemness is confirmed, in the sense that the 
Markov assumption cannot be rejected in most of the years, especially in the most recent years. 
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6.2   Decomposition of the European "System" 
 
Since the improvement of the prediction is based on a summation (I = Σi qi 2log (p'i / pi)), one is able 
to raise the question of which countries are contributing most to the stability of the European system 
in which year.  Table 6 gives the decomposition for the eleven countries involved in the Maastricht 
Treaty.  Note that, for reasons of normalization, one can only compare the decomposition over the 
years in terms relative to the (sum-)value of the set (that is, the "EC").  Since sumvalues are positive 
for most of the years (see also Table 5) a negative sign can be used as a first order indicator of a 
country's failure to integrate. 
 On the basis of Table 6, it is clear that monetary integration does not imply economic 
integration, and vice versa.  While the ERM crises of the early 1990s are clearly visible in the case of 
currencies like the UK Sterling, the Italian Lire, and the Spanish Peseta, their underlying economies 
seem to have become more, rather than less, integrated with the rest of the European economic 
system.  Actually, for Spain and the UK the assumption of the Markov property holds since 1992 in 
terms of real exchange rates. 
 On the other hand, a number of countries which were coupled to Germany in terms of 
montary policies, appear to have been less successful in keeping step with the German economy.  
When real effective economic exchange rates are used instead of nominal exchange rates, predictions 
based on the Markov property fail the test since 1993 in the case of Belgium, Denmark, France, and 
The Netherlands.  Note that this does not imply, for instance, that Spain is doing better than France in 
terms of economic performance.  What it means is that the economies of these countries are 
differently coupled in terms of their co-evolution with an emerging European system. 
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 7  Summary and Conclusions 
 
The main research question of this study has been whether a European system is emerging in the 
monetary and the economic dimension.  A first conclusion is that, according to the political approach 
most clearly represented by the Maastricht Treaty, the European Monetary System certainly is 
"converging" to integration.  Measured by the standards of the Protocol on the Convergence Criteria, 
the European system has indeed "converged" with respect to inflation rates, interest rates, fiscal 
deficits, as well as in terms of nominal exchange rates.  The introduction of a single currency, which 
effectively implies a system of fixed nominal exchange rates, can be considered as the "end" of this 
monetary integration process.   
 The European Monetary System was established in 1979 with the explicit purpose of 
attaining this end, by narrowing the "band widths" within which the exchange rates of its members 
would be allowed to fluctuate.  In 1992-1993, this so-called Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 
proved too rigid, when serious currency crises forced the UK and Italy to withdraw from the system.  
Eventually, the crises led to a substantial widening of the band widths in the fall of 1993.  Although 
this new arrangement eroded the ERM in practical terms, it became considerably easier for countries 
to meet the "convergence criteria" for exchange rates laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, according to 
which eligible EMU members must have respected the normal fluctuation margins of the ERM 
"without severe tensions for at least the last two years before the examination." 
 On the basis of information theory, we have shown that, if "convergence" is defined in terms 
of contributions to system formation, then those countries which adopted a floating or strongly 
fluctuating nominal exchange rate regime after the currency crisis, have failed to converge in nominal 
terms.  In terms of "real convergence," however, these countries turn out to have performed "better," 
in the sense that they have contributed more to the formation of a system at the economic level than 
countries whose monetary regimes have been coupled strongly with that of Germany.  In this case, 
monetary integration has obviously not implied economic integration, or vice versa.  Our results 
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suggest that strong monetary coupling has provided a negative feedback to economic integration in 
more recent years. 
 In our opinion, more attention should have been paid to the theory of "optimum currency 
areas" (Mundell, 1961).  From this perspective, a successful monetary union requires a considerable 
amount of real wage flexibility and labor mobility in order to compensate for "real" divergence in 
terms of output and employment rates.  Heylen et al. (1995) have shown that current rigidities in 
European labour markets make it unlikely that these conditions can be met.  The authors of the 
Maastricht Treaty, on the other hand, seem to have presumed that the European Union constitutes a 
so-called "efficient market" in which prices reflect all relevant information, so that monetary 
integration will imply economic integration.  On the basis of our results, we conclude that this 
assumption is mistaken. 
 
 
* The authors acknowledge partial funding by the European Commission, TSER project PL97-1296, 
entitled "The Self-Organization of the European Information Society." 
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i.Council of the European Communities, and Commission of the European Communities (1992), 
Treaty on European Union, Luxembourg: Office for Offical Publications of the European 
Communities 
ii.For the purpose of reaching nominal convergence alone the criteria seem partially redundant. 
Long-term interest rates, for instance, are generally considered to reflect (expected) inflation 
differentials, as well as changes in nominal exchange rates and fiscal deficits. Since all these variables 
depend, in turn, on monetary policy, it has been argued that "monetary convergence is not really a 
pre-condition for monetary union, but is just an obvious effect of it." (Giovannini 1994: 189). 
Bofinger (1994) has argued that the very expectation of future exchange rate fixing causes nominal 
variables to converge well before the actual monetary union is established. 
iii.On the relation between nominal and real convergence, see, e.g., Heylen et al. (1995). 
iv.Starting in 1979 with the Benelux, Denmark, France, Germany, and Italy, the EMS was later joined 
by the UK, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and Austria, and includes now all fifteen EU 
member states, most of which have also participated in the ERM.  During the EMS crisis in the fall of 
1992, the UK, which had joined in 1990, was forced to withdraw from the ERM, along with Italy.  
Since 1992, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Sweden, and the UK have maintained floating exchange 
relations. The Greek Drachme, however, does not participate in the ERM mechanism. 
 
 
 
  
v.This definition can be extended to a so-called second- or higher-order Markov property in which 
more previous states are taken into account. In general, however, a system's development is not 
dependent on the historical trajectories of its elements. 
vi.In terms of bits, the occurrence of a 50-50 event produces exactly one unit of information: h(0.5) = 
2log(2). 
vii.It can be shown (Theil 1972: 59f.) that I >= 0, that is, a change in the distribution is always 
associated with positive information being generated unless the distribution remains the same.  In the 
latter case, I is equal to zero because no (probabilistic) entropy is generated when there is no change 
in a system. 
viii.The OECD additionally provides rates for the European Currency Unit ECU.  However, we have 
left these normalized values out of consideration in this study since it would beg the research 
question.  (SDR at the bottom line of this table stands for "Special Drawing Rights" of the IMF.  This 
information, however, is not relevant in the context of this study.) 
ix.The OECD notes that the projections are based on the technical assumption that exchange rates 
remain at their levels of 4 November 1996, except for Greece, Hungary, Poland, and Turkey, where 
exchange rates vary according to official exchange rate policy. 
x.The REER indices are provided by the IMF in terms of both relative consumer price indices (CPI) 
and unit labor costs (ULC).  These are two marginally different measures of domestic prices and costs 
(IMF 1981).  In this study, we shall use CPI-based REER indices since our interest is primarily in 
terms of purchasing power parity. 
xi.As perhaps expected, a one-factor solution (explaining 73.8% of the variance) exhibits the DM-
block consisting of the Netherlands (-0.99555), Austria (-0.99541), and Germany (-0.99514) as the 
principal component, while the UK (0.98867) and Greece (0.96876) are the most pronounced 
representatives of the alternative.  The US and Hong Kong Dollars follow with factor loading of 
0.84205 and 0.83210, respectively.  The Yen is again linked with the DM, as is the French Franc, yet 
at lower levels (-0.83619 and -0.59192, respectively).  
xii.The factor analysis (used above) is normalized for size effects because of the Pearson correlations 
underlying it as a first step. 
xiii.In some years, however, the assumption of a global monetary system provided the better 
prediction using this test.  This is in line with our expectation of the possibility of weak systemness at 
the global level because of the ongoing operation of markets. 
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Table 1: Nominal exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar (the OECD data set).   
Source: OECD, 1996. 
 
             1984     1985     1986     1987     1988     1989     199      1991     1992     1993     1994     1995     1996*    1997*    1998* 
 
US           1.0      1.0      1.0      1.0      1.0      1.0      1.0      1.0      1.0      1.0      1.0      1.0      1.0      1.0      1.00 
JAPAN      237.6    238.6    168.5    144.6    128.1    138.0    144.8    134.5    126.7    111.2    102.2     94.1    109.0    114.1    114.1 
GERMANY      2.846    2.944    2.173    1.797    1.756    1.880    1.616    1.659    1.562    1.653    1.623    1.433    1.502    1.513    1.513 
FRANCE       8.739    8.984    6.927    6.009    5.957    6.380    5.446    5.641    5.294    5.662    5.552    4.991    5.105    5.118    5.118 
ITALY     1757     1909     1491     1297     1302     1372     1198     1241     1232     1572     1613     1629     1543     1520     1520 
UK           0.752    0.779    0.682    0.612    0.562    0.611    0.563    0.567    0.570    0.666    0.653    0.634    0.642    0.609    0.609 
CANADA       1.295    1.366    1.389    1.326    1.231    1.184    1.167    1.146    1.209    1.290    1.366    1.372    1.361    1.337    1.337 
AUSTRALIA    1.141    1.432    1.496    1.429    1.281    1.265    1.282    1.284    1.362    1.473    1.369    1.350    1.279    1.269    1.269 
AUSTRIA     20.01    20.69    15.27    12.64    12.34    13.23    11.37    11.67    10.99    11.63    11.42    10.08    10.56    10.64    10.64 
BELGIUM/LUX 57.76    59.43    44.69    37.34    36.77    39.4     33.42    34.16    32.15    34.55    33.46    29.5     30.91    31.21    31.21 
CZECH/SLO    ***      ***      ***      ***      ***      ***      ***     29.47    28.26    29.15    28.79    26.54    27.13    26.96    26.96 
DENMARK     10.36    10.59     8.09     6.84     6.73     7.31     6.19     6.39     6.04     6.48     6.36     5.6      5.79     5.81     5.81 
FINLAND      6.003    6.196    5.070    4.396    4.186    4.288    3.823    4.043    4.486    5.721    5.223    4.367    4.583    4.536    4.536 
GREECE     112.7    138.1    139.5    135.2    141.7    162.1    158.2    182.1    190.5    229.1    242.2    231.6    241.4    250.1    252.60 
HUNGARY      ***      ***      ***      ***      ***      ***      ***     74.8     79.0     91.9    105.1    125.7    152.7    176.2    203.40 
ICELAND     31.73    41.54    41.1     38.68    43.05    57.11    58.38    59.1     57.62    67.64    69.99    64.77    66.65    66.38    66.38 
IRELAND      0.923    0.946    0.747    0.672    0.657    0.706    0.605    0.622    0.588    0.683    0.670    0.624    0.627    0.611    0.611 
MEXICO       0.192    0.327    0.639    1.418    2.281    2.495    2.841    3.022    3.095    3.115    3.389    6.421    7.604    7.905    7.905 
NETHERLANDS  3.209    3.322    2.450    2.026    1.977    2.121    1.821    1.870    1.759    1.857    1.820    1.605    1.682    1.697    1.697 
NEWZEALAND   1.767    2.026    1.917    1.695    1.529    1.674    1.678    1.729    1.860    1.851    1.687    1.524    1.454    1.411    1.411 
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NORWAY       8.169    8.594    7.392    6.737    6.517    6.903    6.258    6.484    6.214    7.094    7.057    6.337    6.450    6.370    6.370 
POLAND       ***      ***      ***      ***      ***      ***      ***      1.058    1.363    1.814    2.273    2.425    2.699    3.047    3.371 
PORTUGAL   146.4    169.9    148.2    140.8    143.9    157.1    142.3    144.4    134.8    160.7    166.0    149.9    153.9    152.9    152.90 
SPAIN      160.8    170.1    140.0    123.5    116.5    118.4    101.9    103.9    102.4    127.2    134.0    124.7    126.4    127.5    127.50 
SWEDEN       8.273    8.602    7.124    6.337    6.129    6.446    5.918    6.045    5.823    7.785    7.716    7.134    6.685    6.589    6.589 
SWITZERLAND  2.350    2.357    1.798    1.491    1.463    1.635    1.389    1.434    1.406    1.477    1.367    1.182    1.231    1.271    1.271 
TURKEY     363      520      669      855     1421     2120     2606     4169     6861    10964    29778    45738    81199   139519   231335  
TAIPEI      39.66    39.85    37.84    31.92    28.57    26.28    26.63    26.55    25.02    26.35    26.45    26.49    27.45    27.5     27.50 
HONGKONG     7.819    7.791    7.804    7.795    7.806    7.799    7.789    7.770    7.739    7.735    7.728    7.734    7.734    7.732    7.732 
KOREA      806.6    870.9    881.0    825.0    730.0    669.2    708.0    733.2    780.0    802.4    804.3    771.4    803.0    825.3    825.30 
SINGAPORE    2.133    2.200    2.177    2.106    2.013    1.950    1.812    1.727    1.628    1.615    1.527    1.417    1.411    1.408    1.408 
 
ECU          1.272    1.322    1.019    0.868    0.846    0.908    0.788    0.809    0.773    0.854    0.843    0.765    0.787    0.785    0.785 
SDR          0.972    0.966    0.853    0.774    0.742    0.780    0.738    0.731    0.710    0.716    0.699    0.659    0.689    0.691    0.691 
 
* On the technical assumption that exchange rates remain at their levels of 4 November 1996, except for Greece, Hungary, Poland and Turkey where 
exchange rates vary according to the official exchange rate policies 
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Table 2 
 
Real Economic Exchange Rates based on Consumer Price Indices for 11 out of 12 countries having signed the Maastricht 
Treaty.  (Source: IMF 1997.) 
 
            1980   1981   1982   1983   1984   1985   1986   1987   1988   1989   1990   1991   1992   1993   1994   1995   1996   
 
 BELGIUM  102.92  104.65  93.80  92.14  95.79  99.80  98.25  98.05  97.85  98.86  100   100.87  98.35  95.34  96.70  95.23  94.81 
 DENMARK   87.66   91.39  88.06  88.25  90.69  94.52  94.97  96.11  98.08  98.58  100    98.35  96.02  93.39  92.78  91.95  92.65 
 FRANCE   101.58  106.11  99.56  95.20  97.83 103.21 100.99  98.97  99.16  99.49  100    98.54  96.57  94.62  94.23  91.96  93.18 
 GERMANY  100     100    100    100    100    100    100    100    100    100     100   100    100    100    100    100    100   
 IRELAND   82.03   88.99  93.83  94.39  98.51 102.67 103.96  99.29  98.30  98.53  100    99.03  97.99  88     88.10  84.30  86.81 
 ITALY     76.24   81.46  81.02  84.84  89.38  91.63  92.69  92.40  93.80  98.38  100   102.36  97.35  79.63  77.12  68.32  76.93 
 LUXEMB.   99.99  106.57  98.52  98    102.27 105.76 100.68  97.18  98.96 101.11  100   101.92  98.83  96.06  96.76  93.68  93.23 
 NETHERL. 101.64  103.23 104.48 102.38 103.50 104.07 103.94 102.44 102.58 100.95  100    99.88  98.16  96.73  97.22  96.30  96   
 PORTUGAL  85.29   98.68  96.39  88.93  94.51  98.40  92.08  87.92  90.71  97.11  100   109.11 114.11 107.31 105.80 103.56 106.04 
 SPAIN     82.87   85.46  83.82  73     78.53  82.18  82.68  83.29  89.28  97.03  100   102.96  98.95  85.43  81.33  78.67  81.65 
 UK       100.63  113.45 107.49  98.09  98.14 102.93  90.50  87.50  96.87  99.65  100   104.12  96.90  84.06  84.08  77.06  79.31 
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Table 3 
Factor Analysis of Nominal Economic Exchange Rates 1984-1996 as provided in Table 
1 above (the OECD data set). 
 
 
Varimax   Rotation  1,  Extraction  1,  Analysis  1 - Kaiser Normalization. 
 
  Varimax converged in    3 iterations.                                  
 
Rotated Factor Matrix: 
 
                FACTOR  1       FACTOR  2 
 
ITALY           .97271                 .19603 
SWEDEN          .92794                 .32636 
TURKEY          .92131           .07906 
SPAIN           .90493           .14521 
GREECE          .80595           .53880 
UK              .79864           .58279 
FINLAND         .79276           .22311 
MEXICO          .73907           .50988 
IRELAND         .71803           .57752 
ICELAND         .66754           .63320 
        DENMARK         -.92685         -.30566 
        FRANCE          -.89369          .22445 
        BELGIUM/LUX     -.87618         -.47089 
        JAPAN           -.87368      -.21942 
        NETHERLANDS     -.81883         -.56667 
        AUSTRIA         -.80986         -.57881 
        GERMANY         -.80863         -.58004 
        SWITZERLAND     -.80463         -.33249 
 
 
HONGKONG        .36416           .91550 
US              .38144           .90861 
AUSTRALI        .46248           .85819 
NEWZEALA        .27835           .84627 
        SINGAPORE       -.46517          .80755 
KOREA           .50386           .79325 
NORWAY          .59151           .78403 
CANADA          .59346           .74605 
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PORTUGAL        .63454           .71919 
        TAIPEI          -.11229          .42892 
 
 
Table 4 
Improvement (or worsening) of the prediction on the basis of the assumption of 
systemness in the data in comparison to univariate timelines, for the case of 28 
worldwide currencies (Table 1) 
 
 
Year               US$                   DM (normalized) 
                                                  
1987          -15.45373781             -8.81156970          
1988          -34.76981583             (0.22679764)          
1989          -23.09606696              6.62319948          
1990           -3.40714030              1.32634893          
1991          -29.99294668             -4.47686200          
1992          -35.50780036            -12.73315871          
1993          -10.23731638             -9.27355928          
1994          -55.41105144            -78.47416628          
1995           -6.84158586            -14.39841047          
1996          -10.44326395            -49.05905527          
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Table 5 
Improvement (or worsening) of the prediction on the basis of the assumption of 
systemness in the nominal exchange data in comparison to univariate timelines, 
for the case of 15 EU member states and 11 EC member states. 
 
 
YEAR            15 member states     11 member states        REER    
   (EU)    (EC)     (EC)     
                                          
1987           -0.82607438              -0.86647414            (0.02511461) 
1988            1.68470963               1.86778215             1.24406229  
1989          (-0.01974935)              0.29255241            -0.11642926 
1990          (-0.08202988)              0.31599596             0.29265731  
1991           -0.24174252               0.48141053            -0.27362359 
1992           -0.70750947              -0.05812540            -0.09436024 
1993           -0.73487024              -0.54354992             0.76952849  
1994            2.40052927               0.18931945             0.52320784  
1995          (-0.09895706)            (-0.05664408)            0.41080807  
1996            2.38339315               2.09119657             1.15037528  
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Table 6 
Improvement of the prediction on the basis of the Markov assumption 
for 10 European currencies in relation to the German Mark 
 
 
a. based on nominal exchange rates 
 
COUNTRY      1987   1988   1989   1990   1991   1992   1993   1994   1995   1996 
 
BELGIUM/LUX  6.21   8.19   3.25  -0.74   1.85   2.15   1.55   5.73   5.77   6.19 
DENMARK      5.38   5.86   2.35  -1.78   0.52   1.51  (0.52)  5.86   4.75   5.39 
FRANCE       4.17   3.03  -1.04  -1.24   1.40   0.64   0.79   6.15   4.97   3.88 
IRELAND      2.46  -1.91  -3.42  -0.38   0.79   0.89   0.89   4.81   4.03   1.54 
ITALY       -1.25   1.77  -1.56  -0.94   0.88  -1.26  -3.37 -14.60  -2.07 -10.72 
NETHERLANDS  7.26  10.47   4.78 (-0.08)  0.87   0.82   1.24   7.04   5.69   5.32 
PORTUGAL   -14.09 -13.14  -9.35  -5.19  -5.35  -3.25   2.95   1.85  -7.07  (0.01) 
SPAIN       -3.91  -3.63   2.34   6.90   5.47   1.25 (-0.94)-10.86 -13.72  -4.67 
UK          -7.09  -8.77   2.94   3.76  -5.95  -2.79  -4.18  -5.78  -2.28  -4.85 
 
EC          -0.87   1.87   0.29   0.32   0.48  -0.06  -0.54   0.19  (0.06)  2.09 
 
 
b. based on real exchange rates 
 
COUNTRY      1987   1988   1989   1990   1991   1992   1993   1994   1995   1996 
 
BELGIUM     -1.81  -1.75   0.72   3.01   1.06   0.94  (0.27) -0.71  -3.71  -3.29 
DENMARK     -2.25  -4.28  -1.90   1.81   1.19   1.42   3.26  -1.02  -1.28  -2.15 
FRANCE      -1.57  (0.02)  1.76   3.22   1.96   2.50   2.88  -1.86  -1.86  -0.82 
IRELAND     -2.70  -0.64   4.48   4.16   1.36   2.03   1.68  -1.98  -1.48  -0.14 
ITALY       -1.30  -3.50  -0.70  -0.96  -1.96  -0.44 (-1.05) -3.79  -2.64   6.49 
LUXEMBOURG   0.54   3.20   1.72   0.74   1.28   0.70   1.44  -0.48  -2.55 (-0.16) 
NETHERLANDS  1.07  -1.99   1.14   5.00   4.40   3.15   1.72  -2.57  -3.11  -3.08 
PORTUGAL     2.91   4.85   1.50  -3.64  -3.81  -7.50 -10.64  -4.12   1.86  -0.76 
SPAIN       -2.11  -3.67  -4.16  -7.45  -6.11  -1.86   0.96   7.45   9.42   2.50 
UK           7.24   9.02  -4.68  -5.61  (0.36) -1.04  (0.25)  9.60   5.76   2.58 
 
EC          (0.03)  1.24  -0.12   0.29  -0.27  -0.09   0.77   0.52   0.41   1.15 
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APPENDIX I 
The prediction of the next value in a time-series 
 
To arrive at an information theoretical equivalent of conventional univariate time series analysis─which we 
will further generalize to the multivariate case─we need to transform the time series of data between the year 
m and the year n into a relative frequency distribution, using: 
 
  Pi =  Fi / Σi=mn    Fi 
 
The distribution may be visualized as follows:  
 
year -> 
┌─────┬─────┬─────┬─────┬─ ── ┬─ ── ┬─────┬─────┬─────┐ 
│ P
m
  │P
m+1 │Pm+2 │     │     │     │Pn-2 │Pn-1 │ Pn  │ 
└─────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─ ── ┴─ ── ┴─────┴─────┴─────┘ 
 
 
In order to extend this series to the year n+1, we compare the distribution in the former series (m, m+1, ...., n-
1, n) with the distribution in the series (m+1, m+2, ...., n, n+1): 
 
year -> 
┌─────┬─────┬─────┬─────┬─ ── ┬─ ── ┬─────┬─────┬─────┐ 
│ P
m
  │P
m+1 │Pm+2 │     │     │     │Pn-2 │Pn-1 │ Pn  │ 
└─────┴─────┴─────┴─────┴─ ── ┴─ ── ┴─────┴─────┴─────┘ 
 ┌─────┬─────┬─────┬─ ── ┬─ ── ┬─────┬─────┬─────┬──────┐ 
 │Q
m+1 │Qm+2 │     │     │     │Qn-2 │Qn-1 │ Qn  │ Qn+1 │ 
 └─────┴─────┴─────┴─ ── ┴─ ── ┴─────┴─────┴─────┴──────┘ 
 
 
It can be shown1 that, if we have a system of mutually exclusive events, E1,....,En with prior probabilities 
                                                 
     1 Cf. Theil (1972), Chapter V, in which he elaborates the theory of Markov chains in relation to 
probabilistic entropy measures. 
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p1,....,pn, then the expected information value of the message which transforms the prior probabilities into the 
posterior probabilities q1,....,qn is given by the following formula: 
 
  I(q:p) =  Σi qi log (qi / pi) 
 
Without any further information, we have no reason to expect the distribution to change when it is shifted 
forward by one step.  Our best guess is, therefore, to assume a stationary distribution.2  Note that this 
assumption is much weaker than the assumption of linearity implied in ordinary least square regression 
analysis; in fact, we are not required to make any further assumptions about the functional form of the 
conditional expectation function. 
 
Since, in the case of forecasting, the data for all years are given except for the year n+1, the best prediction for 
Qn+1 must be based on the addition of ∆I = 0 for the (n+1)th year, implying Qn+1 = Pn. 
 
Qn+1 and Pn are defined in terms of the series data as follows: 
 
  Pn =  Fn / Σi=m  n    Fi 
  Qn+1 =  Fn+1 / Σi=m+1  n+1 Fi 
 
Thus, Qn+1 = Pn implies: 
 
  Fn / Σi=m  n    Fi  =   Fn+1 / Σi=m+1  n+1 Fi 
 
                                                 
     2 I is an inverse measure of the quality of the prediction. If all the q's are equal to their respective p's, the two 
distributions are identical, and hence the prediction is perfect: in this case I vanishes. It can also be shown that in 
all other cases I is positive; this fact corresponds to our intuitive notion that any change implies a message with 
additional information. (I may also be regarded as a measure of dissimilarity between distributions.) 
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However, obviously:  
 
  Σi=m+1 n+1   Fi = (Σi=mn  Fi) - Fm + Fn+1 
 
which implies, by substitution: 
 
   Fn+1       Fn 
  ────────  = ── 
  Σmn Fi - Fm + Fn+1  Σmn Fi  
 
 
 
from which it can be derived that:  
 
 
 
     (Σmn Fi) - Fm 
  Fn+1    =    { ────────── } * Fn      
     (Σmn Fi) - Fn 
 
 
 
We have now written the value of the indicator F for the year n+1 as a function of the value of that same 
indicator in the previous years of the series. The coefficient is the sum of the time series minus the value for 
the first year of the series divided by the same sum minus the value of the last year. 
 
Instead of the values of Fi one could use the moving averages during a certain number of years in order to 
smooth out disturbances in the values for various years.3  In fact, this gives an intuitive basis for the idea of 
                                                 
     3 Alternatively, depending on the research question, one may follow Theil (1966: 325-7) who sought to 
improve the predictions based on information theory by weighting more recent data linearly by using the 
following formula:  
 
   N * Fn + (N-1)* Fn-1 + (N-2)* Fn-2 + ... + F1 
 Σ Fi'   =     ─────────────────────────────────── 
     ½ N * (N + 1) 
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potential interaction between autoregression and the moving average in time series analysis. Since the formula 
contains the Σi for most of the series both in the numerator and in the denominator, the weighted average 
already functions as a momentum which cancels out some of the disturbances. In a moving average process, a 
disturbance affects the system for a finite number of periods (the order of the moving average) and then 
abruptly ceases to affect it.  
 
However, whether we compute with raw data or with moving averages, the question remains as to how many 
years to include in the time series, i.e., how to determine m in the above formulas.  Different starting years 
will result in different factors.  If one does not want to take this decision upon visual inspection of the graphs, 
one can program this problem into the computer: let m run from 1 to n, and compute, for each m, the 
prediction of Fn+1, Qn+1, and subsequently I as a function of all the q's and p's involved in this run.  The m 
which leads to the lowest I, and correspondingly the Fn+1 derived from that m, can be considered as the best 
prediction we are able to make on the basis of this series. 
 
 
Generalization to the multi-variate case 
 
Analogously to the arguments presented above, we can develop the following figures for the multi-variate 
prediction: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
The assumption of equality for Qn+1 and Pn in order to estimate next year's share can be maintained; however, the 
computation of relative frequencies and predictions becomes a bit more complex. 
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year -> 
         
┌──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬ ─ ─ ─┬ ─ ─ ─┬──────┬──────┬──────┐ 
│ P1,m │P1,m+1│P1,m+2│      │      │      │P1,n-2│P1,n-1│ P1,n │ 
└──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴ ─ ─ ─┴ ─ ─ ─┴──────┴──────┴──────┘ 
│ P2,m │P2,m+1│P2,m+2│      │      │      │P2,n-2│P2,n-1│ P2,n │ 
└──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴ ─ ─ ─┴ ─ ─ ─┴──────┴──────┴──────┘ 
|      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | 
┌──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┬ ─ ─ ─┬ ─ ─ ─┬──────┬──────┬──────┐ 
│ Pj,m │Pj,m+1│Pj,m+2│      │      │      │Pj,n-2│Pj,n-1│ Pj,n │ 
└──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┴ ─ ─ ─┴ ─ ─ ─┴──────┴──────┴──────┘ 
  ┌──────┬──────┬──────┬ ─ ─ ─┬ ─ ─ ─┬ ─ ─ ─┬──────┬──────┬──────┐ 
  │Q1,m+1│Q1,m+2│      │      │      │Q1,n-2│Q1,n-1│ Q1,n │Q1,n+1│ 
  └──────┴──────┴──────┴ ─ ─ ─┴ ─ ─ ─┴ ─ ─ ─┴──────┴──────┴──────┘ 
  │Q2,m+1│Q2,m+2│      │      │      │Q2,n-2│Q2,n-1│ Q2,n │Q2,n+1│ 
  └──────┴──────┴──────┴ ─ ─ ─┴ ─ ─ ─┴ ─ ─ ─┴──────┴──────┴──────┘ 
  |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      |      | 
  ┌──────┬──────┬──────┬ ─ ─ ─┬ ─ ─ ─┬──────┬──────┬──────┬──────┐ 
  │Qj,m+1│Qj,m+2│      │      │      │Qj,n-2│Qj,n-1│ Qj,n │Qj,n+1│ 
  └──────┴──────┴──────┴ ─ ─ ─┴ ─ ─ ─┴──────┴──────┴──────┴──────┘ 
 
 
As before, the best prediction for Qj,n+1 is obtained when no substantive information is added on the basis of a 
priori reasoning.  Since this occurs if and only if Qj,n+1 = Pj,n, we have: 
 
     Fj,n+1        Fjn 
 ────     = ──── 
 Σi=m+1n+1 Σj Fij    Σi=mn Σj Fij  
 
 
 
However, noting that 
 
 
 
 Σi=m+1n+1 Σj Fij  =  Σj { Σi=mn  Fij - Fmj + Fn+1,j } 
 
 
 
we have 
 
 
      Σi=mn  Σj Fij - Σj Fmj + Σj Fn+1,j 
 Fj,n+1  = Fjn *     { ──────────────────────  } 
     Σi=mn Σj Fij 
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       Grandsummn  - Columnsumm + Columnsumn+1 
 Fj,n+1  = Fjn *        { ────────────────────── } 
     Grandsummn 
 
 
Since the columnn sum for the year n+1 is a normalization factor,4 the term on the right hand is a constant, 
from which may conclude that the best prediction for next year's distribution will always be the current 
distribution. This is also called the Markov property. 
 
In summary, one can now make two optimal forecasts: one on the basis of the values of each individual 
element of the system, and another for the system as a whole, i.e., on the basis of the system's distribution in 
the previous year. Since the information theoretical approach is thus essentially nonparametric, its 
requirements with respect to the number of observations and the measurement scale are much weaker than 
those of conventional ARIMA time series models or cross section regression analysis.5 
 
 
     4 The prediction of the value of this sum may, for example, be calculated univariately on the basis of the time 
series for the column sums by using methods from the previous section. 
     5 On the advantage of the nonparametric character of information theoretical measures, see: Theil (1966 and 
1967); Krippendorff (1986); Leydesdorff (1995). For a general introduction in using information theory, see: 
Theil (1972). 
